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ABSTRACT 
In the Early Modern period, there was a systematic flow of precious metals from the 
American colonies to Spain and Portugal and, from there, throughout the world. In this 
paper, I use newly discovered data on the black market for silver in Cadiz to reconstruct a 
picture of Castilian smuggling and international silver flows in the Age of Bullionism (1729-
1741). The arbitrage equation shows persistent violations of the silver-point that made 
arbitrage systematically profitable until devaluation pegged the exchange rate to the 
arbitrated parity. Market structure explains the persistent violations. The Cadiz shadow price 
was lower than the international market price because bullionist regulations configured an 
oligopsonistic structure. The price gap was the reason for the Castilian silver outflows to 
Europe. 
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 “Laws made against Exportation of Money or Bullion, will be 
all in vain. Restraint, or Liberty in that matter, makes no 
Country Rich or Poor: As we see in Holland; which had plenty 
of Money under the free liberty of its Exportation; and Spain, 
in great want of Money under the severest penalties against 
carrying of it out”.  
Locke (1695): Further Considerations Concerning Raising the 




The discovery of America was followed by a flow of precious metals to Spain and Portugal 
and, from there, throughout the world. Gold and silver were of large and growing importance 
in international trade during the Early Modern period. Spain was a main player in this 
international trade because the Spanish-American colonies produced three quarters of the 
world’s silver and one half of the world’s gold. Historiography has estimated the quantities of 
gold and silver transferred from the New World to the Old World, but we know little about 
the reasons for the bullion outflows. This paper analyzes the causes of precious metal 
outflows from Castile to the main northwestern European bullion centers in the early 18th 
century. 
 
Castile enacted bullionist laws to prevent the outflow of precious metals during more than 
four centuries, from the Late Middle Ages to the mid-19th century. Administrative prices 
prohibited the exchange of gold, silver or billon at a different price than the official parity, 
and bans on exports forbade the exportation of gold or silver without a license. The 
consequence of the bullionist legislation was the absence of a free bullion market. However, a 
black market developed and a majority of the silver that arrived from Spanish America was 
smuggled from Cadiz to the rest of Europe. This paper provides black market prices for silver 
in Cadiz. The international character of the arbitrage business forced merchant-bankers to 
exchange information continually. Letters between correspondents of the merchant house 
Roux (Marseille) provide data with which to calculate the silver-point mechanism to measure 
the profitability of arbitrage exactly as 18th-century merchants practiced it. The discovery of 
data on the black market for silver in Cadiz has been a milestone in helping to understand the 
reasons behind the silver outflows. 
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The common understanding of the operation of the specie-point mechanism refers to an 
institutional setting of free bullion movements, such as that of the late 19th century1. But 
bullionist restrictions changed the performance of silver points. Smuggling was led by a cartel 
of foreign merchants who had the market power to drive down the price of silver in the Cadiz 
black market and the necessary international connections to illegally extract and distribute 
bullion from Cadiz. The silver-point mechanism shows that, from 1729 to 1737, the gap 
between the implicit spot exchange rate and the lower silver point made arbitrage 
systematically profitable. From mid-1737 to 1741, the gap was corrected because the Spanish 
crown reacted to the illegal silver outflows with a devaluation that equalized the implicit spot 
exchange rate and the arbitrated parity, so arbitrage stopped being profitable. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The first section explains Castilian bullionist regulations 
against silver exports and how smuggling took place. The second section analyzes the 
oligopsonistic structure of the silver black market in Cadiz, which drove down silver prices. 
The third section describes silver arbitrage according to the Roux banker archive. The fourth 




1. WHY SILVER SMUGGLING?: THE RULES OF THE LAW VERSUS THE RULES 
OF THE GAME 
 
Castilian economic policy in the Early Modern period was dominated by the strategy of 
controlling the precious metal that arrived from the colonies. Spanish America produced 85% 
of the world’s silver and 50% of the world’s gold during the period from 1493-1820.2 Bullion 
mines in Spanish America were operated by private agents, who had to pay 20% of their total 
extraction to the Monarch.3 Precious metals were repatriated to Castile in the Spanish vessels 
that traded with the colonies. In the 18th century, royal remittances represented 10% of total 
precious metals repatriated, and private remittances represented the remaining 90%.4 Thus, 
                                               
1 Officer (1986), Canjels, Prakash-Canjels and Taylor (2004), Flandreau (1996, 2004), and Esteves, Reis and 
Ferramosca (2007). 
2 Calculated from Merril, C.W. (1930) and Ridgway, R.H. (1929) 
3 The extraction tax for precious metals was 20% (quinto Real - Royal fifth), and it was reduced to 10% (diezmo 
Real – Royal tenth) in the 18th century (in 1716 for Mexico and in 1735 for Peru). Haring (1939), p. 198. 
4 Average remittances for the period 1717-1786, calculated from García-Baquero (2003), p.114 
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Castile received a systematic inflow of gold and silver by private agents from the colonies. 
Because Castile was the main producer of precious metals, bullionist laws were implemented 
to retain bullion in Castile according to the bullionist doctrine of precious metal possession as 
the measure of wealth. All Castilian legislation about trade with the colonies was 
subordinated to the government’s goal to accumulate precious metals in Spain.5 Bullionist 
policy remained the essence of state economic policy during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, 
reinforced through stagnated legislation and immobile institutions.6 
 
Castile enacted bullionist laws that originated in the late Middle Ages and remained in 
force until colonial independence. Castile’s bullionist legislation was characterized by 
anachronistic contents based on the successive ratification of previous laws. Two types of 
bullionist laws regulated bullion exchange with the objective of avoiding bullion outflows: 
administrative prices and bans on exports. 
On the one hand, the price of the exchange of precious metals into Spain was regulated.7 
Ingots had to be sold to the mint at the mint price. Administrative prices prohibited the 
exchange of gold, silver or billon coins at a different price than the official parity, i.e., the 
legal value of coins in units of account8. The fixation of an administrative price for precious 
metals in Spain was regulated by the Mint Regulation of the year 1497 and was in force until 
the Reform of the Monetary System of the year 1848.9 Successive regulations modified the 
official parity between coins and the unit of account but maintained the prohibition against 
selling coins as commodities at a higher price than the official parity. Consequently, no legal 
market existed in which to freely exchange precious metals as a commodity. Castile only 
                                               
5 Girard (1967), p. 33 
6 Bernal (1999), Stein and Stein (2000), p. 6. 
7 Recopilación ley IV tit 18 lib 5 year 1498, Recopilación ley VI tit 18 lib 6 year 1550, Recopilación cap 18 aut 
16 tit 21 lib 5 1652, Recopilación aut 40 tit 21 lib 5 year 1704, Nueva Recopilación ley X lib IX tit XVII year 
1743. 
8 The aim of these laws was to prevent the exportation of bullion: “We have been informed that there is so much 
greed to take gold coins out of our kingdoms, that both foreigners and natives are involved in the business of 
collecting gold coins and paying for them more than their value, in order to take them out to other kingdoms, 
thus making profits, with no fear of the punishments that our laws provide; as the laws of our kingdom stipulate 
that no one can pay for coins more than their value”[“porque somos informados que es tanta la codicia, que hay 
en sacar la moneda de oro de nuestros reinos que así extranjeros como naturales tiene por trato de recoger la 
moneda de oro y dar por ella más de lo que vale, por la llevar a otros reinos y ganar por ella, sin temor de las 
penas de nuestras leyes contenidas, que por las leyes de nuestro reino está proveído que por las monedas no se 
pueda llevar más de lo que valen”] (ley VI, tít 18, lib 6 R year 1550) 
9 The Mint regulation was compiled in Ordenanzas que regulan las Casas de Moneda de 13 de Junio de 1497. 
This regulation prohibited the exchange of silver at a higher price than the Mint Price, but there is no reference to 
gold. The price of gold was regulated in the following year (Ley IV tit 18 lib 5 Recopilación year 1498). The 
reform of the monetary system in 1848 was compiled in RD de 15 de abril de 1848. 
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accepted precious metals as money, exchanged at the official parity. At the end of the 18th 
century, contemporaries claimed that “Spain is absolutely the only country in Europe in which 
there is not trade of gold and silver, and where there is no specialized merchant house 
dealing with this kind of business”.10 
On the other hand, bans on exports prohibited the export of gold and silver without a 
license until the mid-19th century.11 The Treasury Department (Consejo de Hacienda) issued 
licenses to export specific amounts of precious metals only to businessmen who justified the 
“provisions that they should make out of the Kingdom”.12 Additionally, the importing of 
precious metals from the American colonies was controlled by the institution that oversaw 
trade with the colonies: Casa de Contratación.13 A merchant had to register gold and silver as 
soon as his vessel tied up in Cadiz and pay the import tax for both ingots and coins.14 Ingots 
had to be sold at the Mint price in the Casa de Contratación and sent to the Mint for minting. 
Coins received a certificate that proved the registration. The transport of precious metals into 
Spain was forbidden by sea or land, except to be delivered to the mint or to be exchanged for 
goods, cases in which a license was needed. 
 
The consequence of bullionist legislation was the absence of a free bullion market. 
However, a black market emerged in Cadiz, and a great proportion of the silver that arrived 
from Spanish America was smuggled from Cadiz to the rest of Europe. The estimates of the 
percentage of silver that was illegally exported are between 14% and 50% in the 16th century, 
up to 85% in the 17th century and approximately 50% in the 18th century. 15  
 
How did the illegal exchange take place? Because Castile prohibited the existence of a 
market for silver, we could have expected the Spanish-American silver to be traded directly to 
the European bullion markets. But this did not happen, and a black market was created in 
Cadiz. The Castilian crown concentrated the monopoly of trade with the American colonies 
using one single port; first, Seville (1495/1503-1717), through the ports of Cadiz and Sanlúcar 
                                               
10 Larruga (1787-1800), vol. 3, p. 44. 
11 The beginning of the prohibition is compiled in Quadernos de Guadalaxara de D. Juan I y D. Enrique III. In 
addition, according to Alcubilla (1868, vol. 9, p. 305), the free export of gold and silver in both ingots and coins 
was permitted from 1849 (RR.OO. 2 November 1849). The bans on export are compiled in Nueva Recopilación 
tit. XIII, lib. IX: “de la saca prohibida de oro, plata y moneda del Reyno”. 
12 Pragmática 13 Septiembre 1628. Madrid. 
13 Recopilación de Indias, lib. IX, tit. XIII. Veitia (1672). Hamilton (1934). 
14 García Baquero (1988), vol. 1, pp. 197-210 
15 Morineau (1985), pp. 242 and 375. Serrano Mangas (1989, p. 316) estimates that 70% of the silver that arrived 
from Spanish America in the first half of the 17th century was smuggled. 
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de Barrameda, and later, Cadiz itself (1717- 1765/1789).16 Cadiz was, therefore, the 
commercial geo-strategic center that connected the Mediterranean Sea - Atlantic Ocean - 
North Sea - Baltic Sea maritime route through the Strait of Gibraltar. Bullion shipped from 
the New World to the Old World had to pass through Cadiz. As the Castilian crown 
concentrated the monopoly of trade with the American colonies in the port of Cadiz, the 
importers from Spanish America and exporters to Europe exchanged silver in the black 
market in Cadiz. 
 
A nationality criterion defined the sides of the silver black market in Cadiz. The supply 
side consisted of the Spanish businessmen who imported the silver from America to Cadiz. 
Trade with the colonies was restricted to the Spanish merchants17, who had to be registered as 
members of the guild Consulado de Cargadores de Indias (Consulate of Delivery Agents for 
the Indies) and could trade for themselves or as commissioners for other Spanish 
businessmen.18 The Consulado de Cargadores de Indias had judicial, fiscal, financial and 
administrative tasks. It was the merchants’ court for the Casa de Contratación, the collector 
of commercial taxes for the monarch, the moneylender for the crown and the registry of the 
merchants with American colonies. Because of the guild’s registry, we know the names of all 
Cargadores de Indias: in our period from 1730-1742, 1,250 merchants were registered.19 
The demand side consisted of the foreign businessmen who illegally exported the silver 
from Cadiz to Europe. These businessmen could not legally trade with the American colonies 
either directly or through the Cargadores de Indias. Silver traveling from the Spanish-
American colonies to Spain was taken directly to the foreign ships anchored in the bay of 
Cadiz, which belonged to foreign merchants living in the city. The foreign merchants who had 
settled in Cadiz smuggled the silver because they were granted diplomatic immunity. Spain 
had granted commercial concessions to foreign merchants through commercial treaties signed 
after the Peace of Westphalia due to the Spanish economic backwardness and loss of political 
power.20 Several clauses in the commercial treaties gave foreign merchants indirect 
advantages for the smuggling of bullion because, although it had been explicitly prohibited, 
                                               
16 Bernal (1992), García-Baquero González (1988, 2002) 
17 Real Cédula 27 July 1592, Real Cédula 24 May 1686, García-Baquero (1991), pp. 69-101, AGI Consulados 
leg 63A year 1747, in Bustos (2005), p. 130. 
18 García-Baquero (1991) pp.69-101. 
19 Ruiz Rivera (1988), p. 113-130, reproduces the list with the names of Cargadores de Indias. 
20 Report about the excess of smuggling, 1738-1744, AGI, sección 5a, Gobierno, Legajo Indiferente General 
2479 (microfilm C-1557 and C-1558). Girard (1967), McLachlan (1974), Stein and Stein (2000). 
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several loopholes gave protection to foreign merchants. Foreign merchants’ books could not 
be searched by Spanish authorities, and foreign merchants could not be prosecuted by a 
Castilian judge. They had special judges of their nationality –juez consensuador- who 
safeguarded their interests according to their national legislation. 
Therefore, Spanish merchants shipped the silver from the Spanish-American colonies to 
Cadiz. In turn, foreign merchants who had settled in Cadiz bought the silver from the Spanish 
merchants in the black market and sold it abroad. Both market sides won with the illegal 
exchange. The silver sellers avoided paying the very high import tax by bringing the silver 
into Cadiz illegally, without registration21. The silver buyers circumvented bans against silver 
exports. Voltaire (1756) described silver smuggling in Cadiz as follows: “The way in which, 
for a long time, foreigners appropriated the gold and silver that the galleons supplied from 
America was singular. The Spaniard, who is the factor of the foreigner in Cadiz, hands over 
the ingots he has received to some brave men called Metedores. These men, armed with small 
pistols and swords, carry the numbered ingots to the city walls, and hand them over to other 
Metedores, who carry them onto skiffs. These skiffs take the ingots onto vessels in the bay. 
These Metedores, these factors, the assistants, the guards who never disturbed them, all of 
them had their rights, and the foreign merchant was never deceived”.22 
 
 
2. OLIGOPSONISTIC STRUCTURE OF THE SILVER BLACK MARKET 
 
Cadiz had a population of approximately 60,000 people in the mid-18th century.23 Its 
economy was based on trade performed by businessmen who practiced wholesale trade with 
America or with the main European commercial and financial centers.24 We have seen in the 
previous section that nationality defined the direction of trade in the market: Spanish 
                                               
21 During the period from 1720-1765, the taxes on gold and silver introduced from America to Castile were more 
than 7% for gold and more than 10% for silver. García Baquero (1988), vol. 1, pp. 197-201 
22 “La manière dont on donna longtemps aux étrangers l’or et l’argent que les galions ont rapportés d’Amérique 
fut encore plus singulière. L’Espagnol, qui est à Cadix facteur de l’étranger, confiait les lingots reçus à des 
braves qu’on appelait Météores. Ceux-ci, armés de pistolets de ceinture et d’épées, allaient porter les lingots 
numérotés au rempart, et les jetaient à d’autres Météores, qui les portaient aux chaloupes auxquelles ils étaient 
destinés. Les chaloupes les remettaient aux vaisseaux en rade. Ces Météores, ces facteurs, les commis, les 
gardes, qui ne les troublaient jamais, tous avaient leur droit, et le négociant étranger n’était jamais trompé” 
Voltaire translated metedor –which literally means person who put something- as “météore” (meteor). The 
emphasis is his. Voltaire (1990) [1756], vol. II, p. 337 
23 Cadiz was one of the main Spanish cities in 1750: Madrid had 160,000 inhabitants, Granada 70,000, Seville 
66,000, Cadiz 60,000, Valencia 60,000 and Barcelona 50,000. Bairoch, Batou and Chèvre (1988), pp. 15-21. 
24 Carrasco (1997) p. 17 
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merchants traded with American colonies, whereas foreign merchants settled in Cadiz traded 
with the European centers. The foreign merchants in Cadiz were the “merchants in the 
shadow”, i.e., those who could not trade with American colonies de jure but who obtained the 
highest net income from the mercantile activity de facto.25 Foreign wholesale merchants 
accumulated more than 80% of the total net income earned by trade in Cadiz by the mid-18th 
century.26 
 
The fiscal statistic Castastro de Ensenada shows the distribution of the net income of 
wholesale merchants by nationality in the mid-18th century (Table 2.1).27 First, the Spanish 
merchants who traded with the Spanish-American colonies represented 59% of all merchants, 
but they earned only 17.5% of the income. Foreign merchants represented 41% of merchants 
and earned 82.5% of the total income. The nationalities of foreign merchants were French, 
Italian, German, Damascene (and Swedish and Prussian), Irish (and English) and Flemish. 
French merchants were the most important community of foreign merchants in Cadiz. They 
represented one quarter of all merchants and earned half of all merchants’ total annual net 










                                               
25 García Baquero (1976), p. 488; Solano (1991), p. 347 
26 Proportion calculated from Campos and Camarero (ed.) (1990), pp. 114-115 (see Table 2.1). Foreign 
wholesale merchants earned approximately the 66% of the total net income earned by trade in Andalusia in the 
mid-18th century. García-Baquero (1991), p. 33 
27 The Catastro de Ensenada was a huge statistic computed by the Castilian government between 1750 and 1756 
in the 22 provinces of the Castilian Crown to replace several taxes (rentas provinciales) with one single tax 
proportional to wealth (contribución única). Therefore, the aim of this statistic was to determine wealth. It 
comprised 40 questions about wealth from different productive activities, and question 31 asked for the annual 
net income of wholesale merchants. The answer for Cadiz broke down the net income of wholesale merchants by 
nationality for the activity of “trade and transfer of bills of exchange” for the year 1753; and, additionally, a 
correction of the statistic in 1762 added the number of merchants. The statistic computed in 1762 also corrected 
the data on net income, but the statistic computed in 1771 considered the 1753 data to be the good data. For this 
reason, I use the data from 1753. See Ruiz Rivera (1988), p. 72. 
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Table 2.1: Wholesale merchants’ net income according to Catastro de Ensenada, 1753 
 CADIZ 
Nationality Wholesale merchants’ annual 
net income (1753) 
Number of 
merchants (1762) 






French 710,450 46.04 60 16.17 
Italian 149,800 9.71 35 9.43 
German 31,000 2.01 3 0.81 
Damascene (Swedish and Prussian) 75,500 4.89 11 2.96 
Irish (and English) 231,100 14.97 30 8.09 
Flemish 74,700 4.84 14 3.77 
Spanish- Cargadores de Indias28 270,724 17.54 218 58.76 
TOTAL 1,543,274 100.00 371 100.00 
Source: Net income data from the Catastro de Ensenada (1753), in Campos and Camarero (ed) (1990), pp. 114-
115; number of merchants from the verification of the Catastro de Ensenada (1762) in García-Baquero (1988), 
vol 1, pp.491-492 
 
The reason for foreign merchants’ settlement in Castile was the attractiveness of the 
American precious metals, although their exportation was forbidden.29 French merchants were 
the most significant foreign merchants in Cadiz in the 18th century because the Spanish 
Succession war had given privileges to the French merchants and expelled English Protestant 
merchants.30 The regional origins of French merchants who settled in Cadiz are shown in 
Figure 2.1. According to a contemporary document written in 1714: “Liste des négocians 
François établis à Cádiz” (List of French merchants settled in Cadiz) (2 January 1714), two 
regions stand out: Bretagne (Saint-Malo) and Provence (Marseille). 
 
On the one hand, the Saint Malo - Cadiz route was the maritime link for trade between 
West France and Spanish America beginning in the second half of the 17th century.31 
According to L’Espagnol (1997), the Cadiz – Saint Malo route constituted one of the major 
European routes of redistribution of American silver beginning at the end of the 17th 
                                               
28 The Spanish are the Cargadores de Indias, but not all Cargadores registered in the Consulado appeared in the 
Catastro de Ensenada. Those who did not appear either did not practice or did not earn enough income, although 
they were registered as Cargadores. Ruiz Rivera (1988), p. 73. 
29 Girard (1967), p. 37. 
30 Carrasco González (1997), pp. 22-26. 
31 See L’Espagnol (1997), p. 403-493. Malouin’s prominent commercial, shipping, and financial roles in the War 
of the Spanish Succession stemmed from previous decades of expansion at Cadiz. During the 1650s, Malouins 
obtained from the Spanish government licenses to ship silver to Saint-Malo in wartime. The regular shipper was 
La Lande Magon of Saint-Malo at Cadiz, the great-grandfather of one of the main silver smugglers. Stein and 
Stein (2000), p. 113 and L’Espagnol (1997), p. 125. 
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century.32 On the other hand, Marseille was the French Mediterranean port on the Old Levant 
route, a traditional channel for gold and silver to the East.33 Flandreau et al. (2009a) pointed 
out the important role played by the Franco-Spanish connection in channeling the American 
treasure out of Spain: concretely, the Franco-Spanish monetary block formed by Madrid-
Cadiz-Lyon-Marseille.34 Merchant families from Bretagne and Provence had sent some of 
their members to Cadiz to expand the geographic network for distributing the silver.35 
 

















Source: Author’s elaboration from “Liste des négocians François établis à Cádiz, 
1714”, in Ozanam (1968), p. 278 (outline map: www.hist-geo.com) 
                                               
32 L’Espagnol (1997), p. 410. 
33 Braudel (1979), vol. 3, p. 619. Marseille is considered in the literature to be one of the main centers of Spanish 
silver smuggling. Bernal (1992), pp. 317-318 and Bustos (2005), p. 390. 
34 Flandreau et al. (2009), pp. 163-164 
35 L’Espagnol (1997), p. 454 
36 There were 80 merchants registered, jointed in 68 Merchant Houses. Twenty-four merchants were from 
Provence (20 from Marseille, 2 from Toulon, 1 from Aix and 1 from Ollioules), 20 from Bretagne (8 from Saint-
Malo, 6 from Nantes, 4 from Morlaix, 1 from Dinard and 1 from Landerneau), 12 from Lyon, and the other 24 
from various places in France: 5 from Orléans, 4 from Rouen, 3 from Paris, 2 from Bordeaux, 2 from Lille, 1 
from Rochelle, 1 from Laval, 2 from Languedoc, and 2 from the Basco-Béarnaise region (Bayonne and Lestelle). 
There were also 2 foreign merchants registered: 1 from Switzerland and 1 from Ypres. 
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The role of Marseille as a bullion trade center grew during the 18th century.37 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that I have located the black market of silver in Cadiz in the Cadiz 
correspondence of the Marseille Merchant House Roux. Indeed, the banker Roux was a 
specialist in arbitraging with bullion in Marseille.38 The Merchant House Roux operated from 
the beginning of the 18th century until the mid-19th century (1728-1843). Roux practiced a 
polyvalent business that embraced many commercial activities developed in a vast 
geographical domain of 360 cities in Europe, Levant, the Barbary Coast and the Antilles, with 
nearly 2,000 correspondents.39 I have examined the Cadiz correspondents who arbitrated with 
silver together with Roux to achieve a good approximation of the major figures of the silver 
smuggling business. According to the Roux archive, the smugglers in Cadiz were the 
following eleven merchant houses: Pierre, Athanase, Jolif et Cie (1729-1730)-Athanase, Jean 
Jolif et Cie (1731-1736)-Alain Jolif et Cie (1737-1741); Guillaume Jogues (1730-1735); 
Jamets, Verduc, Vincent et Cie (1733-1736)-Verduc, Vincent et Cie (1737-1740); Duval-
Baude (1733)-Duval-Baude et Cie (1739); Guillaume Macé (1729-1738)-Guillaume Macé, 
fils et Cie (1739-1740); Casaubon, Béhic et Cie (1731-1741); Le Couteulx le jeune et Cie 
(1729-1731)-J. Le Couteulx, A. Le Normand et Cie (1733-1741); Magon et Lefer frères 
(1730-1740); Galibert, Cayla, Cabanes et Cie (1730-1735); Jean Solier et Cie (1734-1739); 
and Antoine et Pierre Masson (1729-1731)-Pierre, Guillaume et Joseph Masson (1733-1736). 
 
The smugglers were the most important wholesale merchants among all French merchants 
in Cadiz according to a contemporary ranking elaborated by J.-B. Partyet, a Maurepas in 
1736.40 Cadiz had an average of 60 French merchant houses from 1724 to 1790. The first-
                                               
37 Rambert (1966), p. 545 
38 Rambert (1954), vol. 4, p. 480 
39 The archive of the merchant house Roux is a remarkable 18th-century commercial archive kept in La Chambre 
de Commerce et d’Industrie de Marseille. Its 1,320 bundles contain 78,274 documents of correspondence, 
14,516 of accounting and 23,216 of commercial matters (sea and land transport, weaponry, food, raw material 
and manufactured goods). Rebuffat (1965), section L.IX. The correspondents in Cadiz reported to the Roux 
merchant house the black market prices of pieces of eight from 1729 to 1741. Then, Roux started to arbitrate 
with silver through the Compagnie Royale d'Afrique. The correspondence from the Compagnie Royale d'Afrique 
has not been preserved, so the series of black market silver prices in Cadiz is uninterrupted only from the 
foundation of the merchant house Roux in 1729 to the foundation of the Compagnie Royale d’Afrique in 1741. 
40 J.-B. Partyet a Maurepas, 12 March 1736, in Ozanam (1968), p.348. “We prepared… a state of the entire 
nation, which was divided into 5 classes according to approximate amount of trade that we believed every 
individual makes… These classes will be reviewed every year in order to consider any change in the trade 
activity of their members, and to include the new merchant houses that could have been set up in Cadiz under the 
French flag”. [“Nous dressâmes... un état de toute la nation, qui fut divisée en 5 classes selon le plus ou le moins 
de commerce que nous estimâmes qu’un chacun fait... Ces classes seront refaites tous les ans pour y insérer les 
changements auxquels la nouveauté qu’il pourroit y avoir dans le commerce de ceux qui les composent 
pourroient donner lieu, et les augmenter des nouvelles maisons qui pourroient s’établir dans la suite à Cadiz 
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class French merchant houses were, on average, in the first quartile of all French merchants in 
Cadiz, and 100% of the smugglers were found within this first class. 41 This means that silver 
smuggling was completely a business of the first-class French merchant houses. 
 
Therefore, the French merchants were the most important group among all foreign 
merchants (Table 2.1), and the smugglers were the most important merchants among the 
French merchants settled in Cadiz (ranking by J.-B. Partyet a Maurepas, 1736). Finally, I use 
a ranking of net income elaborated by Consulado de Cargadores de Indias in 1771 for the 
project of fiscal reform “contribución única” to identify the importance of the silver 
smugglers relative to the total number of merchants in Cadiz. 42 The results are summarized in 
Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Wholesale merchants’ net income by nationality, 1771 
Net income 
(pieces of 









FLEMISH ITALIAN SPANISH 
         0-  7,999 80 14 38 18 43 283 
  8,000-15,999 15 4 4 1 4 1 
16,000-23,000 6 1 0 0 0 0 
24,000-31,999 2 0 2 0 0 0 
32,000-39,999 3 0 0 0 0 0 
40,000+ 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Total number 108 19 44 19 47 284 
Net income 
per capita  
6,606 5,605 5,418 3,932 3,198 954 
Source: Author’s calculations using the list: “Relaciones de comerciantes remitidas a la Escribanía de Cabildo, 
a 3 de junio de 1771” (Archivo General de Indias, Consulados 892 bis), reproduced in Ruiz Rivera (1988), pp. 
65-72. 
 
The French group had the highest net income per capita, followed by the German, Irish, 
Flemish, Italian and Spanish groups. Only 1% of all merchants earned a net income higher 
than 32,000 pieces of eight of old silver, and all of them were French. The composition of the 
French group was fairly stable - lists available from the 16th century almost always show the 
same names43 - which makes it easier to compare the names of smugglers who appear in Fond 
                                                                                                                                                   
sous pavillon françois”] Quotation reproduced in Ozanam (1968), p. 269 
41 They all were first class –although Jolif and Jogues moved from first to second class and Lecouteulx from 
second to first class. 
42 The list contained the names and net incomes for all wholesale merchants in Cadiz and was used to implement 
the “contribución única” project of fiscal reform, which started in the 1750s. 
43 Mauro (1990), p. 280 
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Roux (1729-1741) with the names listed in the “contribución única” project of fiscal reform 
(1771). The five merchants with the highest net income among all merchants in Cadiz were 
the silver smugglers: Casaubon Domingo, por sí y Casaubon Behic y Cia, Solier, Marcos, por 
sí y por Cayla, Solier, Hermanos Cabanes y Compañía, Verduc, Pedro y Compañía, Masson, 
Josèph y Cia, and Lefer, Francisco por sí y Magon y Lefer Hermanos.44 These top merchants 
who appear as the smugglers in Fond Roux are the same merchants denounced by the Spanish 
authorities as bullion smugglers (1738-1744): Casaubon, Behic et Compagnie and Cayla, 
Solier, Cabanes et Compagnie.45 
 
Thus, smuggling was practiced only by a few very powerful foreign merchants who were 
able to smuggle the silver because they had an international distribution network and were 
granted diplomatic immunity to smuggle without the risk of being captured. The French 
smugglers were organized in a cartel of a few powerful merchants linked in networks. 
Historical 18th-century trade networks combined formal limited-partnership ties with informal 
alliances based on family ties. Marriage, partnership and trade were closely related. Merchant 
and family networks linked individuals from similar geographic origins and professions and 
were a common strategy used by Irish, Italian and French merchant houses and by merchants 
coming from the North of Spain and Catalonia. Alliances helped merchant houses to achieve 
stability and adequate operation and contributed to the expansion of merchants’ networks 
towards the main centers of European and Atlantic trade.46 
Stable networks were based on the principles of obedience and submissiveness to the 
decisions made by the family hierarchy. The power of the corporate family to interfere in the 
life of its members was strong. Both women and young men depended on family decisions. 
The agents sent to Cadiz by French merchants were generally their sons or other members of 
their families. They were often young bachelors who were learning commercial skills to 
                                               
44 The fifth most important merchant was not one of our smugglers: Gilly, Simón, por sí y su Compañía. But this 
merchant house did not exist in our arbitrage period (1729-1741). It appears in the ranking of French merchant 
houses in Cadiz of 1746. The other smugglers had lower net incomes that were still higher than the average: 
Jolif, Juan y sus hermanos compañeros: 8,000 and Maccè, Nicolás, por Guillermo Maccè, Hijo y Cia: 8,000. Le 
Couteulx did not appear in Contribución Unica. Only his partner appeared: Lenormand, Antonio por sí y su 
compañía: 18,000. However, according to Almanach Général des marchands (1772, p. 73), the company was Le 
Couteux, Le Normand & Compagnie. Guillaume Jogues and Duval-Baude disappeared from the ranking of 
French merchant houses in Cadiz of 1746. Ozanam (1968), p. 348. 
45 Archivo general de Indias, sección 5ª, Gobierno, legajo 2479, Indiferente general (microfilm C-1557 and C-
1558) 
46 Fernández (1997), pp. 173-174, Stein and Stein (2000), p. 72, Bustos (2005), pp. 465-469 
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create a branch in Cadiz or to eventually take charge of their parents’ firms in France.47 These 
agents were placed in the care of the members of the initial network of foreign businessmen 
who had previously settled in Cadiz.48 
 
The merchants’ biographies obtained from notaries and ecclesiastical sources illustrate the 
strategies that bullion smugglers used to develop their networks in Cadiz: the long-run 
stability of their merchant houses was guaranteed by the transfer of partnership to younger 
relatives, and the houses’ power was increased by strategic marriages that linked the most 
important merchant houses. On the basis of the biographies, I found ties among six of the 
eight merchant houses studied.49 These merchant houses were mutually connected by the 
family and partnership ties that configured the cartel of smugglers (Figure 2.2). 
 












Source: Author’s analysis. Biographies are available in Bustos Rodríguez (1995), Bustos Rodríguez (2005), 




                                               
47 Girard (1967), Mauro (1990), p. 280, Fernández (1997). 
48 Carrasco (1997), p. 52 
49 I could not find ties with other houses in the cases of Cayla, Cabanes, Solier et Cie and LeCouteulx, Le 
Normand et Cie, either because they were really not connected to other houses or because I could not trace the 
connections. 
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Manuela J., the daughter of Gilo Pain, a French wholesale merchant in Cadiz, married 
Guillaume Macé, who was a partner of the French merchant house Macé et Cie. Gilo Pain’s 
other daughter was married to Juan Béhic, another French merchant, who was a partner of the 
house Casaubon, Béhic et Cie. Juan Béhic’s daughter, María Josefa, married Tomás Mª 
Gaillard, a member of the merchant house Magon Lefer. Another member of Magon Lefer, 
Bernard Magon, married María Verduc, who was the daughter of Julian Pedro Verduc, 
partner of the merchant house Verduc, Kerloguen, Payan et Cie. Julian Pedro Verduc’s other 
three daughters also married French wholesale merchants: Margarita Verduc to Juan Jolif, 
partner of the house Jolif; and Tomasa Verduc and Norberta Verduc to two members of 
Verduc’s own company, Payan and Kerloguen, respectively. Finally, the merchant house 
Verduc, Kerloguen, Payan et Cie had an attached partner, Masson, who was another of the 
French bullion smugglers in Cadiz. 
 
The most important implication of the existence of a cartel of mutually connected 
smugglers was their ability to drive down silver prices in the Cadiz black market. Smugglers 
were the price-makers, as contemporaries recognized: 
“Despite  this division of the body of merchants into 4 classes, by which the first one is formed 
by 12 houses, and it can be said that these 12 houses are practically of the same range, I 
believe it is my duty to inform you that the houses of Mr. Masson, Verduc, Vincent et Cie., 
Magon el Lefer, and above all, those of Mr. Casaubon, Béhic et Cie, and Cayla, Solier frères, 
Vendun et Cie., receive more merchandises, be they from France or from foreign countries, 
than the rest of the nation altogether; that Mr. Casaubon and Béhic, Masson, Wailsh, 
Handricx, Sobia et Vande, and Cayla, Solier frères, Vendun et Cie are believed to be the 
wealthiest Frenchmen in Cadiz: these merchant houses are the ones that largely rule the 




                                               
50 “Malgré cette division du corps des négocians en gros en 4 classes, par laquelle la première étant composée 
de 12 maisons, on a lieu de juger que ces 12 maisons sont à peu près de la même portée, je crois cependant 
devoir, Mgs., vous observer que les maisons des Srs Masson, Verduc, Vincent et Cie, Magon et Lefer, surtout 
celles des Srs Casaubon, Béhic et Cie, et Cayla, Solier frères, Vendun et Cie, reçoivent plus de marchandises, 
soit de France, soit du pays étranger, que tout le reste de la nation ensemble; que les Srs Casaubon et Béhic, 
Masson, Wailsh, Handricx, Sobia et Vande, et Cayla, Solier frères, Vendun et Cie passent pour les plus riches 
François de Cadiz: que ce sont ces maisons qui réglent principalement le prix du change, ainsi que celle des 
Srs Le Couteulx, qui est considérable pour cette partie du commerce”. The emphasis is mine. Partyet à 
Maurepas, 4 April 1746, in Ozanam (1968), p. 272-273 
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The nationality criterion of trade with Spanish America prevented silver from going 
directly to the European bullion markets: Spain imported and foreign merchants exported the 
silver, so a bullion black market appeared in Cadiz. Bans on exports created a barrier of entry 
to the business of illegal silver exports. Only foreign merchants who had diplomatic immunity 
could smuggle silver. In addition, only those foreign merchants powerful enough to have the 
international connections necessary to extract the silver were able to smuggle. The most 
important French merchants were the leaders of the smuggling operation and were organized 
into a cartel that drove down silver prices in Cadiz below the international price. Therefore, 
arbitrage with silver from Cadiz to the main European financial centers guaranteed systematic 
profitability. The next section explains how arbitrage took place according to Roux banker 
ledgers of silver arbitrage. 
 
 
3. SILVER ARBITRAGE ACCORDING TO ROUX BANKER ARCHIVE 
 
I performed an accurate reconstruction of arbitrage with silver practiced by 
contemporaries according to information from the Roux banker’s archive. Arbitrage was a 
joint venture that set up operations for merchant-bankers in different cities on a joint account 
(“compte à demi” or “compte a tiers”)51, and its success lay in the application of double-entry 
bookkeeping and the knowledge of local units of mass and world geography52. Arbitrage with 
bullion was denominated “bullion trade” (“commerce des matières”),53 and its logic can be 
understood thanks to the documents kept in the accounting section of the archive “arbitrage 
accounts” (“comptes d’arbitrage”). The following examples explain arbitrage with silver (see 
                                               
51 Taylor (1964), pp. 483-484 
52 Double-entry bookkeeping system (ou a l’italienne) in Ricard, 1732, p. 521-600. Roux “exported” the system 
of double-entry bookkeeping for arbitrage with specie to his correspondents abroad. For example, J. A. Henry, 
correspondent in Constantinople, explained (1778): “We are going to follow your method of maintaining the 
accounts of arbitrage in two columns, which will be easier (…). By this current method, everything in a single 
account” (« Nous allons suivre votre méthode de tenir le compte d’arbitrage en deux colonnes ce qui sera 
beaucoup plus facile (…) Par cette méthode actuelle, le tout se trouve remis dans un seul compte ») and 
Peschaire from Naples (1784): “I have already written my accounts ½ in my books exactly as you have 
suggested, which is, effectively, the most succinct and clear method” (« J’ai déjà fait le compte à demi sur mes 
livres exactement comme vous me l’indiquez, ce qui est, en effet, la manière la plus succincte et la plus claire ») 
Carrière (1973), pp. 767-779. 
53 Matières was the French word for bullion in the 18th century, according to the Roux archive. This same word is 
still used in the Rothschild archives in the mid-19th century. See Flandreau (1995), pp. 193-225 
 17
Figures 3.1 and 3.2).54 Arbitrage was conducted between two or three partners from different 
cities, who bought pieces of eight in Cadiz and usually sold them in other European centers, 
such as London, Paris or Marseille. The first partner was the Roux merchant house in 
Marseille, the second partner was its correspondent in Cadiz and the third partner was a 
banker from a European center (e.g., Lyon, Paris, Amsterdam). The profit, namely, the 
difference between buying prices in Cadiz and selling prices abroad, was shared among the 
partners. 
 
Figure 3.1 shows arbitrage with silver between three partners operating with a joint 
arbitrage account during the year 1728. The partners were Raymon Bruny et Cie55 from 
Marseille, Brethous Clock et Cie from Cadiz and Guillaume Louis de Surmont from 
Amsterdam, who had a joint arbitrage account (“compte a tiers”) in Amsterdam. When the 
silver arrived in Cadiz from Spanish America, the partner of the joint account in Cadiz, 
Brethous Clock, bought the silver in Cadiz in exchange for a bill of exchange in Cadiz on 
Amsterdam. The seller of silver in Cadiz cashed the bill to receive a credit balance in 
Amsterdam, while Bruny, Clock &Louis de Surmont had one entry on the debit side of the 
joint arbitrage account ledger. Then, Brethous Clock shipped the silver from Cadiz to Paris 
and London, and Bruny’s correspondents in Paris and London sold the silver there in 
exchange for bills of exchange in Paris or London on Amsterdam. The buyer of silver reduced 
his credit balance in Amsterdam, while Bruny, Clock & Louis de Surmont cashed the bills in 
Amsterdam, thus having one entry on the credit side of the joint arbitrage account ledger. 
Finally, the profit was calculated as the difference between the entries on the credit side and 
the entries on the debit side. This profit was shared among the three partners at the end of the 






                                               
54 Fond Roux, L. IX section II- compte arbitrage: liasse 53. These two examples are the only accounts of specie 
arbitrage preserved for our period of study because the accounting registers were destroyed in a fire in 1941. 
Rebuffat (1965), p. 89. 
55 Raymon Bruny was Roux’s uncle. On 1 October 1728, he transferred the merchant house Raymon Bruny et 
Cie to his two nephews, Jean-Baptiste-Ignace and Pierre-Honoré Roux. The new merchant house was named 
Jean-Baptiste, Honoré Roux et Cie. Rebuffat (1965), p. 89. 
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Source: Author’s elaboration from Fond Roux, L. IX section II- compte arbitrage: liasse 53. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows arbitrage with silver between three partners operating with a joint 
arbitrage account during the year 1730. Jean-Baptiste et Honoré Roux from Marseille, Magon 
et Lefer frères from Cadiz and Tourton Baur et Cie from Paris had the arbitrage account in 
Paris. First, Magon et Lefer frères bought the pieces of eight in Cadiz in exchange for a bill of 
exchange in Cadiz on Paris, which was cashed in one entry on the debit side of the joint 
arbitrage account. Second, Magon et Lefer frères shipped the silver from Cadiz to Marseille, 
and Roux sold the silver in Marseille in exchange for a bill of exchange in Marseille on Paris, 
                                               
56 Cp  denotes the black market price of silver in Cadiz; Lp  and Pp  are the market price of silver in London 
and Paris, respectively; CAx  is the spot exchange rate in Cadiz on Amsterdam; LAx  is the spot exchange rate in 
London on Amsterdam; and PAx  is the spot exchange rate in Paris on Amsterdam. 
 
A M ST E R D A M  
B runy  (M arseille ), C lock (C adiz) &  Lo uis S urm o nt (A m sterda m )  
 
arb itrage  acco u nt  1 /3  
(schellingen  ban co )  
·C CAp x ·L LAp x
·P PAp x
( · · ) ·L LA P PA C CAprofit p x p x p x  
C A D IZ  
s ilv er se lle r    s ilver bu yer  
                              (C lock)  
 
C lo ck  b ought P ieces of E ight 
in ex chan ge for  a b ill of 
ex change in C adiz on  
A m sterda m  
P A R IS  
s ilver se ller         silv er bu yer 
(B run y corresp )  
 
B runy  sold P ieces of E ight in 
ex chang e for  a b ill of ex chang e in 
P aris  on A m sterda m  
d ebit  cred it  
L O N D O N  
s ilver se ller         silv er bu yer 
(B run y corresp )  
 
B runy  sold P ieces of E ight in 
ex chang e for  a b ill of ex chang e in 
L ond on on A m sterda m 
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which represented one entry on the credit side of the joint arbitrage account. At the end, the 
profit, calculated as credits minus debits, was shared among the partners. 
 













Source: Author’s elaboration from Fond Roux, L. IX section II- compte arbitrage: liasse 53. 
 
The examples have shown that arbitrage was conducted between silver and bills of 
exchange instead of the traditional version of arbitrage between gold and silver.58 Arbitrage 
with silver was cashed with a multilateral bill-of-exchange payment.59 According to the 
examples, silver arbitrage from Cadiz to Paris and London was settled through a third center, 
Amsterdam, and silver arbitrage from Cadiz to Marseille was settled through a third center, 
Paris. The great negotiability of bills of exchange drawn on the main financial centers allowed 
the multilateral settlement in the 18th century. Flandreau et al. (2009a) recently measured the 
                                               
57 Cp  denotes the black market price of silver in Cadiz; Mp  is the market price of silver in Marseille; CPx  is the 
spot exchange rate in Cadiz on Paris; and MPx  is the spot exchange rate in Marseille on Paris. 
58 For arbitrage between bullion and bills in the Early Modern period, see Quinn (1996) and Nogues-Marco 
(2011a). 
59 International trade was based upon multilateral payments in the 18th century. Heckscher (1950), Sperling 
(1962) and Flandreau et al. (2009a). 
 PARIS 
Roux (Marseille), Magon et Lefer (Cadiz) & Tourton Baur (Paris) 
 
arbitrage account 1/3 
(livres tournois) 
 
·C CPp x ·M MPp x
· ·M MP C CPprofit p x p x 
MARSEILLE 
silver seller         silver buyer 
(Roux) 
 
Roux sold Pieces of Eight in 
exchange for a bill of exchange in 




silver seller         silver buyer 
 (Magon et Lefer) 
 
Magon et Lefer bought Pieces of 
Eight in exchange for a bill of 
exchange in Cadiz on Paris 
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degree of multilateralism of bills of exchange in mid-18th-century Europe: only 18% of bills 
were directly traded between two cities, 75% had to pass through an intermediary center and 
7% needed two intermediaries60. The main financial centers were the intermediary connecting 
centers: Amsterdam, Paris and London. It is thus not surprising that silver arbitrage was 
settled through the main financial centers (Amsterdam and Paris in examples 1 and 2, 
respectively). Sellers of silver in Cadiz preferred to have a credit balance in the main financial 
centers rather than in Cadiz. 
 
The next section measures the profitability of silver arbitrage explained in this section 
according to Roux merchant-banker ledger accounts. 
 
 
4. SILVER-POINT MECHANISM, CADIZ-LONDON THROUGH AMSTERDAM 
 
The profitability of arbitrage is measured with the silver-point mechanism formula, which 
represents arbitrage operations as explained with previous examples. Although the dynamic of 
silver arbitrage permitted the use of different destination centers for different arbitrage 
operations, the scarcity of bullion market prices for the 18th century limits the calculations to 
one single arbitrage operation: silver shipped from Cadiz to London through Amsterdam. 
 
The silver-point mechanism represents the law of one price for silver specie, i.e., in the 
absence of transportation and other transaction costs, competitive markets will equalize the 
price of the silver coin old Mexican piece of eight in the two centers, London and Cadiz, when 
both prices are expressed in the same currency: 
· ·L C CA LAp p x x           (4.1) 
where Lp  denotes the market price of silver in London (pence sterling), Cp  denotes the black 
market price of silver in Cadiz (peso de plata antigua), CAx  is the spot exchange rate in Cadiz 
on Amsterdam, LAx  is the spot exchange rate in London on Amsterdam and ·CA LAx x  denotes 
the multilateral spot exchange rate between London and Cadiz through Amsterdam (pence 
sterling/pesos de plata antigua). 
 
                                               
60 Flandreau et al. (2009a), p. 162 
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In reality, arbitrage involved costs. The silver-point mechanism between Cadiz and 
London through Amsterdam considering costs is given by equation 4.1 plus costs, as 
represented by equation 4.261: 
(1 ) · (1 )L LCL CA LA LC
C C
p pc x x c
p p





 is called arbitrated parity62; CLc  is the cost of trading the silver from Cadiz to 
London; and LCc  is the cost of trading the silver from London to Cadiz. 
 
The specie-point mechanism recognizes that gold and silver, along with bills of exchange, 
may be used to settle international payments. The exchange rate will not be exactly the 
arbitrated parity, but it will fluctuate within the silver-points because shipping silver involved 
transaction costs. To prevent arbitrage, for a given spot exchange rate between Cadiz and 
London and the market price of silver in London, the market price for silver in Cadiz could 
not rise higher than the point where it became profitable to send silver from London to Cadiz 
or fall lower than the point where it became profitable to send gold from Cadiz to London.  








, exporting silver from London to Cadiz is profitable, and if the exchange 







, exporting silver from Cadiz to London is 
profitable. Thus, silver-point breaks mean that the exchange rate falls below or rises above the 
                                               
61 The multilateral silver-point mechanism equals the bilateral specie-point mechanism defined by Flandreau  
(1996, p. 422 and 2004, p. 59), assuming the arbitrage condition for the triangular arbitrage of bills of exchange, 
i.e.,: ·CA LA LCx x x , where CAx is the spot exchange rate between Cadiz and Amsterdam, LAx is the spot 
exchange rate between London and Amsterdam, and LCx  is the spot exchange rate between London and Cadiz. I 
tested the stochastic integration for the bills of exchange market, i.e., drawing a hypothetical spot bill between 
London and Cadiz is equivalent to drawing a hypothetical spot bill between Cadiz and Amsterdam plus another 
bill between London and Amsterdam. The spot exchange rate in London on Cadiz and the spot exchange rate in 
Cadiz on Amsterdam multiplied by the spot exchange rate in London on Amsterdam are strongly correlated 
(Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.96), so I accept the integration of the bills market. Therefore, the results do 
not differ between bilateral and multilateral arbitrage. Contemporaries practiced multilateral arbitrage because 
the sellers of silver preferred to have credit balances in the main centers (e.g., Amsterdam) rather than in Cadiz, 
not because they obtained an extraordinary profitability through the triangular arbitrage with bills. 
62 The arbitrated parity (or arbitrated par of exchange) between London and Cadiz is defined by the relative 
market prices: /L Cp p . Arbitrated par of exchange is a 19
th century wording. Flandreau (1996, p.422 and 2004, 
p. 59). See also Tate (1834, pp. 169-170). Merchants in the 18th century used the name “par or equality of 
exchange” Giraudeau [1756] (1796, p. 15) or the name “accidental par”. Newton (1734). 
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bullion point at which sending silver from one center to the other become profitable. We 
should expect breaks to be short lived because arbitrageurs will buy silver in the center with 
the lowest market price and sell it in the center with the highest market price, which will 
adjust prices to eliminate arbitrage profitability. Thus, the process of arbitrage should 
maintain the exchange rate within silver-points, and few and no persistent breaks are 
expected. This reasoning works well when silver movements are free. Nogues-Marco (2011a) 
has calculated the specie-point mechanism for London and Amsterdam in the mid-18th 
century and demonstrates that bullion markets were integrated when bullion movements were 
free; thus, only a few non-persistent breaks occurred. International arbitrages ensured 
uniformity in the market price of gold and silver in London and Amsterdam in the 18th 
century. 
But international arbitrages do not ensure uniformity in the market price of silver when 
bullion movements are controlled. The arbitrage mechanism of adjustment demands free 
bullion movements and perfect competition where both buyers and sellers are price takers. 
However, we have seen in previous sections that Castile forbade bullion exports and free 
bullion exchanges, and the oligopsonistic structure of the black market of silver in Cadiz 
enabled buyers to purchase silver at a lower price than would have prevailed in a competitive 
market. Buyers were price markers, so drove down prices to create systematic arbitrage 
profitability. I construct the lower silver point according to equation 4.2 to measure 
profitability in exporting silver from Cadiz to London. The Appendix explains the data and 
calculations, and Figure 4.1 shows the lower silver-point between Cadiz and London through 
Amsterdam. 
 
According to results shown in Figure 4.1, we can distinguish two different periods. In the 
first period, from 1729 to 1737, there was a systematic gap between the implicit spot 
exchange rate and the lower silver-point, which made arbitrage systematically profitable. 
International markets were connected through smuggling, but smuggling did not ensure 
uniformity of the silver prices in Cadiz and London. In a perfectly competitive market, 
arbitrageurs should have bought silver at the lowest market price (Cadiz) and sold it at the 
highest market price (London), which would have adjusted prices to make arbitrage 
unprofitable. However, in an imperfect competitive market, long-run profitability was 
maintained over nine years without price adjustment because oligopsony drove down prices in 
Cadiz. Figure 4.2 measures profitability as the gap between the exchange rate and the 
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arbitrated parity (gross profitability) and the gap between the exchange rate and the lower 
silver-point (net profitability, i.e., gross profitability minus costs). 
 
Figure 4.1: Lower band of arbitrage equation between London and Cadiz, 1729-1741 
(half-monthly observations), pence sterling/peso de plata antigua  















































































































implicit multilateral spot exchange rate arbitrated par lower smuggling point 
 
Source: see Appendix 
 



















































































































Gross Profit no data cost
 
Source: see Appendix. 
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Figure 4.2 shows the profitability of the silver arbitrage from Cadiz to London. From 1729 
to 1737, arbitrage was systematically profitable because there was a gap between the 
oligopsonistic price in Cadiz ( oligop Cp p ) and the international price in London 
( * ·Lp p x )








, exporting silver from Cadiz to London becomes profitable. According to 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the exchange rate was systematically below the lower silver band because 
the oligopsonistic price in Cadiz was below the international price:  
*· oligopL Cp x p p p            (4.3) 
The difference between the international price and the oligopsonistic price in Cadiz 
measures the oligopsonistic market power. The larger the gap between the oligopsonistic and 
the international prices, the higher the oligopsonistic power. However, the oligopsonistic price 
has a floor, which is the official parity ( p ). The oligopsonistic price cannot be lower than the 
official parity, i.e., the legal value of the old Mexican pieces of eight coin. If the 
oligopsonistic black market price was lower than the official parity, the sellers of silver in 
Cadiz would move the silver from the commodity market to the money market because coins 
circulated at the official parity in the money market: 
oligop
Cp p p            (4.4) 
 
The existence of a floor for the oligopsonistic market price gave the government the 
possibility to apply an exchange rate policy oriented to the bullionist aim of avoiding silver 
outflows. On 16 May 1737, the Spanish government moved the official parity from 1 piece of 
eight coin equal to 10/8 peso de plata antigua to 1 piece of eight coin equal to (10 5/8)/8 peso 
de plata antigua.64 In other words, the government fixed the official parity at the same level 
as the international price to remove the arbitrage profitability (see Figure 4.2). The 
devaluation equalized the implicit spot exchange rates and the arbitrated parity from mid-
1737 to 1741, so arbitrage stopped being systematically profitable (see Figure 4.1). 
 
                                               
63 Assumes that the London market is a competitive market and its price represents the international price. 
British law has permitted the exportation of bars and foreign coins in gold and silver since 1663 (Munro, 1992, 
p. 212). Our representative coin, the old Mexican piece of eight, had a free quotation in the London Stock 
Exchange in the 18th century. 
64 Autos Acordados (1772), libro 5, título XXI, auto 61. Novísima Recopilación (1805), libro 9, título XVII, ley 
8, and Innocencio Aparici (1741), pp. 24-26 
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Therefore, the oligopsonistic price was enclosed between the international competitive 
price and the official parity. The international price was the maximum price because the 
oligopsonistic markdown is equal to zero at the international price (equation 4.3). The official 
parity was the minimum price because below the official parity, sellers would use the coins as 
money at the official parity and would not sell them as commodities (equation 4.4). Merging 
equations 4.3 and 4.4 gives the oligopsonistic price enclosed between the international market 
price and the Cadiz official parity: 
* oligopp p p            (4.5) 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the Cadiz oligopsonistic price enclosed between the international market 
price and the official parity. The grey zone shows the net profitability of arbitrage. Before the 
devaluation, the buyers of silver in Cadiz gained the difference between Cadiz shadow market 
prices and London prices (grey zone). The oligopsonistic price fluctuated between official 
parity and the international price (equation 4.5), but the devaluation increased official parity at 
the international price level. The gap between international market prices and official parity 
was reduced, thus eliminating the possibility of driving down the shadow prices in Cadiz 
below the international price. 
 
Figure 4.3: Official parity in Cadiz and market prices in London and Cadiz, 1729-1741 





















































































































Cadiz Official Parity Cadiz Official Parity (adjusted by weight)
(London market price*exchange rate)-costs (*) Cadiz market price
London market price* exchange rate (*)  
Source: see Appendix.  
(*) Cadiz prices are given per coin, while London prices are given per standard ounce. Abrasion has been added 
to London prices to compare with Cadiz prices. 
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In summary, Figure 4.4 summarizes the behavior of the silver-point mechanism with free 
bullion movements compared with bullionist controls. For a case of free bullion movements, 
we should have expected occasional silver-point violations adjusted by arbitrage. That is, for 
a given London-Cadiz exchange rate and silver price in London, the silver price in Cadiz 
should not fall lower than the point at which sending silver from Cadiz to London became 
profitable. If the silver-point were violated, we would expect that arbitrageurs bought silver in 
the center with the lowest market price and sold it in the center with the highest market price, 
which would adjust prices to eliminate arbitrage profitability. However, obtained silver-points 
for a case of bullionist controls show a very different picture. From 1729 to 1737, there was a 
systematic bias between the implicit spot exchange rate and the lower silver point that made 
arbitrage systematically profitable. Despite smuggling, which connected international 
markets, arbitrage did not adjust prices because the oligopsonistic structure of the black 
market in Cadiz maintained shadow prices below the international price to make arbitrage 
profitable. But from 1737 to 1741, the bias was corrected because the Spanish government 
reacted to the illegal bullion outflows with a devaluation, which equalized the implicit spot 
exchange rates and the arbitrated parity. The long-run effectiveness of devaluation will 
depend on the evolution of international price levels. The problem of the exchange rate policy 
is that the international price is a variable and, therefore, in order to maintain the bullionist 
political goal, the government must change the official parity occasionally according to the 
fluctuation of international prices.  
 


























E X P E C T E D  S IL V E R  P O I N T S  O B T A I N E D  S I L V E R  P O IN T S  
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Castile applied several devaluations that are compiled in Castilian legislation. The 
legislation states specifically that avoiding the extraction of specie was the reason for the 
devaluations65. Devaluation restricted bullion outflows, but it was an unpopular monetary 
policy because it changed the legal relation between the unit of account and the medium of 
exchange; thus, it altered the measure of value and provoked “darkness, confusion and 
abuses” in the Castilian monetary system.66 
 
The most interesting implication is the effect of oligopsony on quantities. Oligopsony 
limited smuggling per se because silver outflows were lower under oligopsony than under 
perfect arbitrage competition. To some extent, oligopsony was helpful to the government. If it 
had not existed, pressures from international prices would have been much greater. Indeed, 
this may explain why the government implicitly accepted the existence of the cartel. Of 
course, smuggling was not good from a bullionist point of view, but cartelized smuggling was 





This paper has calculated the profitability of silver arbitrage from Cadiz to London to 
understand the basis for the Castilian bullion outflows by combining new data from primary 
sources collected in the Roux banker archive (Marseille). The arbitrage equation measures the 
gap between the exchange rate and the relative bullion prices in two centers. If the gap is 
larger than the arbitrage costs, arbitrage is profitable, and bullion will be shipped from the 
cheapest to the most expensive center. 
 
When studying arbitrage profitability in Spain, a basic problem arises. Market prices for 
bullion are not available because no legal bullion market existed. As the main producer of 
precious metals, Spanish monetary policy focused on hindering the movement of gold and 
silver from the American colonies to other countries. From the late Middle Ages until the 
mid-19th century, administrative prices prohibited the exchange of gold, silver or billon at a 
different price than the official parity, and bans on exports forbade the exportation of gold or 
                                               
65 Autos acordados, Libro V, titulo XXI, auto L and auto LI, 14 January 1726 
66 Dictamen sobre moneda, 4 Dec 1834, in Prieto and De Haro, 2004, pp. 210. 
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silver without a license. The consequence of the bullionist legislation was the absence of a 
free bullion market and the formation of a black market for bullion in Cadiz. The discovery of 
data on the silver black market in Cadiz has permitted the profitability of silver arbitrage to be 
calculated in the present study. 
 
The silver black market in Cadiz was not a perfectly competitive market. The sides of the 
black market for bullion in Cadiz were defined by nationality. The suppliers of silver in Cadiz 
were the Spanish merchants who could legally trade with the colonies. The demanders of 
silver were the foreign merchants who had settled in Cadiz and who were not allowed to 
import silver from the Spanish colonies. These foreign merchants had diplomatic immunity 
and could therefore illegally extract the silver from Cadiz and smuggle it to main centers in 
Europe. The French merchants who had settled in Cadiz were the main smugglers, and they 
were the most important merchants in Cadiz according to Spanish fiscal sources and French 
contemporary reports on French merchants who settled abroad. 
 
The smugglers’ network reveals the oligopsonistic structure of the silver black market in 
Cadiz. The most important foreign merchants in Cadiz were members of international 
societies with partner companies abroad. The smugglers were organized in long-run networks 
and were specifically directed to undertake illegal trade operations between the Spanish-
American colonies and Europe through Spain. Networks gave smugglers enough market 
power to drive down the price of silver and provided them with the necessary international 
connections to illegally extract and distribute bullion from Cadiz. Silver smugglers were the 
price-markers, according to contemporary reports. 
 
The capability of smugglers to drive down prices made arbitrage systematically profitable. 
The archival research in the account books of Fond Roux, a leading 18th-century French 
merchant from Marseille, provides an explanation of the exact working of the arbitrage with 
silver. The arbitrage was conducted between silver and bills by three partners from different 
cities. The first partner was the Roux merchant house in Marseille, the second partner was its 
correspondent in Cadiz, and the third partner was a banker from another European center. 
These partners had a joint arbitrage account in a main financial center, for example 
Amsterdam, to settle the arbitrage operations. The partner in Cadiz bought the silver in the 
Cadiz black market in exchange for a bill of exchange drawn in Cadiz on the main center, 
Amsterdam. The seller of the silver in Cadiz cashed the bill to receive a credit balance in 
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Amsterdam, while the arbitrageurs had one entry on the debit side of the joint account ledger. 
The partner in Cadiz shipped the silver from Cadiz to a main European bullion market, for 
example, London. The correspondent in London sold the silver in exchange for a bill of 
exchange drawn in London on Amsterdam. The buyer of silver reduced his credit balance in 
Amsterdam while the arbitrageurs cashed the bill in Amsterdam, thus having one entry on the 
credit side of the joint account ledger. Finally, the profit was calculated as the difference 
between the entries on the credit side and the entries on the debit side in the joint account 
ledger. This profit was shared among the three partners after deducting costs. 
 
The profitability of arbitrage has been measured using the silver-point mechanism. This 
paper reconstructs the silver-point mechanism between London and Cadiz through 
Amsterdam for the period from 1729-1741, for which half-monthly quotations of silver in the 
Cadiz black market are available. I consider data of arbitrated parity between the two centers, 
arbitrage costs, and spot exchange rates calculated from the exchange rate paid in bills of 
exchange at maturity. Then, I compare the implicit spot exchange rate with the arbitrated 
parity adjusted by costs. Results show that, from 1729 to 1737, the gap between the implicit 
spot exchange rate and the lower silver-point made arbitrage systematically profitable. From 
mid-1737 to 1741, the gap was corrected because the Spanish crown reacted to the illegal 
silver outflows with a devaluation that equalized the implicit spot exchange rate and the 
arbitrated parity; thus, arbitrage stopped being profitable. 
 
In summary, this article has analyzed the behavior of the silver-point mechanism for a case 
of bullionist controls. A silver-point mechanism with free bullion movements does not yield a 
systematic profitability of arbitrage because violations of the silver-point provoke arbitrage, 
which will adjust prices to eliminate profitability. However, a silver-point mechanism with 
bullion controls explains continuous silver flows because the market power created by the 
bullion controls preserves the price gap between the international and domestic silver prices, 
thus maintaining systematic profitability despite arbitrage. In the case of Castile in the early 
18th century, bullionist regulations distorted the system and created a black market for silver. 
The black market was controlled by the most relevant foreign merchants, who had diplomatic 
immunity for smuggling and were organized in a cartelized network to drive down prices in 
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APPENDIX: SILVER-POINT MECHANISM DATABASE 
 
This appendix explains the variables used to calculate the lower silver point: the silver 
market prices in London ( Lp ), the silver black market prices in Cadiz ( Cp ), the arbitrated par 
of exchange ( /L Cp p ), the multilateral spot exchange rate between Cadiz and London 
( ·CA LAx x ) and the cost of trading the silver from Cadiz to London ( CLc ). 
 
Silver market prices in London ( Lp ) 
Data are taken from The Course of the Exchange, a twice-weekly financial bulletin that 
was first published in the 1690s.67 The silver price was measured in shillings (s) and pence (d) 
units of account per standard troy ounce.68 The Course of the Exchange collected data on 
silver bars and foreign silver coins, specifically pieces of eight.69 I collected half-monthly 
prices of the Mexican pieces of eight at the beginning and the middle of every month - the 
precise dates correspond to the dates of the Cadiz data (see Figure A1). When quotations were 
given in a range, I converted ranges to the midpoint. England used the Julian calendar, but 
because Cadiz used the Gregorian calendar, I converted the dates of the Julian calendar (Old 









                                               
67 McCusker and Gravestijn (1991). 
68 Equivalent units of account were as follows: 1 pound Sterling (£-librae)=20 shilling, 1 shilling (s-solidi)=12 
pennies (d-denarii). The fineness of the standard troy ounce was the Sterling Standard (Old Standard), which had 
92.5% fineness. Fallon (1988, p. 9). The equivalences among the units of mass were 1 English Pound Troy=12 
Ounces, 1 Ounce=20 Pennyweights, 1 Pennywt=24 Grains, 1 Grain=20 Mites. (Newton, 1731). One standard 
troy ounce was equivalent to 31.103496 grams in the International System of Units. Lemale (1875, p. 189) 
69 The Course of the Exchange compiled quotations on the Pillar piece of eight and Mexican piece of eight from 
1721 onwards and on small Pillar pieces of eight and small Mexican pieces of eight from 1732 onwards. Pieces 
of eight were the only coins quoted in financial bulletins in London during the 18th century (until March 1795, 
when the French New Louis began to be quoted together with the pieces of eight). 
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Figure A1: Price of old Mexican pieces of eight on the London Stock Exchange, 
































































































































Market Price Old Mexico Pieces of Eight Official Parity Market Price Silver Bars Standard
 
Source: Course of the Exchange for market prices and Feavearyear (1931, p. 346) for official parity. 
 
Silver black market prices in Cadiz ( Cp ) 
Data are taken from the correspondents’ letters kept in the Merchant House Roux.70 Cadiz 
correspondents reported the black market silver prices and sometimes added a description of 
the relationship between exchange rates and silver prices or a direct recommendation on 
arbitrage (i.e., whether to buy pieces of eight). Silver prices appeared inside the text or at the 
end of the letter together with the exchange rates (Figure A2 shows an example of pieces of 
eight quotations inside the text of the letter). 
 







Source: Fond Roux, L. IX liasse 819 : letter Guillaume Jogues, 30 October 1730 
                                               
70 Cadiz correspondence is compiled in Fond Roux L.IX. Section IV: Correspondance passive Cadix, liasses 
810-856. 
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Cadiz correspondents’ letters in the Roux archive reported almost half-monthly black 
market prices of old and new Pillar and old and new Mexican pieces of eight. Letters were 
reported every week or two weeks.71 I collected half-monthly prices of old Mexican pieces of 
eight (see Figure A3).72 When quotations were in a range, I converted them to the midpoint. 
Prices were reported as the percentage of premium over the unit of account peso de cambio 
(also called peso de plata antigua or peso de plata vieja) per old Mexican piece of eight coin. 
The peso de plata vieja is an imaginary coin whose legal equivalence with the Spanish-
American piece of eight coins was defined in Castilian legislation as follows: 
 from 08/09/1728 to 16/05/1737:73 1 piece of eight coin=10/8 peso de plata antigua 
from 16/05/1737 to 29/05/1772:74 1 piece of eight coin=(10 5/8)/8 peso de plata antigua 
 
The old Mexican piece of eight was struck in 67/8 pieces of 93.056% fineness per standard 
Cologne mark (25.60722 grams of fine silver/coin).75 The Mint retained 3/8 pieces for 
seigniorage and brassage and gave 64/8 pieces to the ingot’s owner.76 The new Mexican piece 
of eight was struck in 68/8 pieces of 91.667% fineness per standard Cologne mark (24.85407 
grams of fine silver/coin). The Mint retained 4/8 pieces for seigniorage and brassage and gave 
64/8 pieces to the ingot’s owner.77 The old Mexican piece of eight remained as legal tender 
with the same legal value as the new Mexican piece of eight, although both coins differed in 
net silver weight.78 Figure A3 shows the market value of the old Mexican piece of eight in 
comparison with official parity (tale value) and official parity adjusted by weight. Observe 
that the market values of old and new Mexican pieces of eight were adjusted by weight 
because the utility of silver in the commodity market depends upon the physical quantity 
(Nogues-Marco, 2011a) 
                                               
71 I collected half-monthly prices available in 50 bundles of Cadiz correspondence from 1729 to 1741, which 
comprise approximately 5,000 letters. Fond Roux. L.IX, liasses 810-856.  
72 The Mexico Mint started to strike the silver coin real in May 1535, in three-reales, one-real and half-real 
pieces, with four-reales pieces beginning in 1537 (Leyes de Indias (1681), book 4, title XXIII, law VII-VIII. 
Pradeau, 2001, p. 35). Old pieces of eight were struck from 1572 to 1734 (cob coins-Equilateral Jerusalem Cross 
type). These old pieces of eight stopped being struck in 1734, but they remained as legal tender; and new pieces 
of eight were struck from 1732 to 1772 (milled coins-Pillars of Hercules type) (Autos Acordados (1772), book 5, 
title XXI, auto 59-60-61-65-70. Pradeau (2001)). 
73 Autos Acordados (1772), libro 5, título XXI, auto 61. 
74 Novísima Recopilación (1805), libro 9, título XVII, ley 8, and Innocencio Aparici (1741), pp. 24-26 
75 One Cologne Mark ingot is equal to 230.465 grams. García-Patón (1903), p. 23 (tablas anejas a la ley de pesos 
y medidas de 19 de junio de 1849), and pure silver (100% fineness) is equivalent to 12 dineros (1 dinero = 24 
granos). Dasí (1950), vol. 1, p. 21. 
76 Law 11/05/1535 in Leyes de Indias (1681), book 4, title XXIII, law VII-VIII and Law 04/11/1886 in Autos 
Acordados (1772), book 5, title XXI, auto 36. See also Céspedes del Castillo (1996), pp. 214-215 
77 Law 09/06/1728 in Autos Acordados (1772), book 5, title XXI, auto 59 
78 Innocencio Aparici (1741) 
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Figure A3: Black market price of old Mexican pieces of eight in Cadiz, 1729-1741 (half-





















































































































market value Old P8 official parity (by tale)
official parity (adjusted by weight) market value New P8
 
Source: Fond Roux, L. IX liasses 810-856 for black market price. Castilian legislation for official parity (see 
text) 
 
The arbitrated par of exchange ( /L Cp p ) 
The arbitrated par of exchange between London and Cadiz is defined by the relative 
market prices: /L Cp p . London silver prices are given per unit of mass (standard ounce), 
while Cadiz silver prices are given per coin. I converted Cadiz prices per coin to prices per 
unit of mass to calculate the arbitrated par of exchange. Old Mexican pieces of eight had the 
following legal features: 930.56 ± 3.472 thousandths of fineness and 27.518 grams of gross 
weight.79 We should also consider abrasion, i.e., weight deficiency with respect to standard 
weight resulting from wear and tear.80 Abrasion is known because coins were always 
weighted according to Roux’s invoices.81 Abrasion was 1.5%, so I considered a net weight 
equal to the legal weight minus abrasion. 
                                               
79 Law 11/05/1535 in Leyes de Indias (1681), book 4, title XXIII, law VII-VIII and Law 04/11/1886 in Autos 
Acordados (1772), book 5, title XXI, auto 36. See also Céspedes del Castillo (1996), pp. 214-215 
80 Officer (1986) and Flandreau (2004) 
81 Invoices measured weight in Castilian units: 1 Marco=8 Onzas and 1 Onza=8 Ochavas. 1 Marco is equivalent 
to 230.465 grams. García-Patón (1903, p.23). One old Mexican piece of eight had a gross weight of 27.518 
grams according to Castilian legislation, whereas it weighed approximately 27.079 grams according to Fond 
Roux invoices. 
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The multilateral spot exchange rate between London and Cadiz ( ·CA LAx x ) 




nx a r   (ducat of exchange/ groot)     (A1) 
where CAx  denotes the implicit spot exchange rate in Cadiz on Amsterdam, CAa  is the 
exchange rate in Cadiz on Amsterdam at 60 days and Ar is the commercial interest rate in 
Amsterdam.82 
 
The implicit spot exchange in London on Amsterdam was calculated according to 
Flandreau, Galimard, Jobst and Nogues-Marco (2009b). The exchange rate in London on 
Amsterdam is quoted systematically in the financial bulletin, The Course of the Exchange, at 
two different maturities: two-months and sight. In an earlier joint work (Flandreau et al., 
2009b), we took advantage of the two maturity quotations to produce a series of commercial 
interest rates for Amsterdam, London and Paris in the 18th century. I reproduce the same 
methodology here to calculate the spot exchange rate in London on Amsterdam. The long 
maturity exchange rate ( [ ]LA la n days ) and the short maturity exchange rate ( [ ]LA sa n days ) can 
be written in terms of the implicit spot exchange rate LAx :  
[ ] /(1 )
365
L l
LA l LA A
na n x r     (sterling pound/schelling bank)   (A2) 
[ ] /(1 )
365
L s
LA s LA A
na n x r     (sterling pound/schelling bank)   (A3) 
Thus, solving the system of equations (A2) and (A3) derives the implicit commercial 
interest rate ( LAr ) and the implicit spot exchange rate ( LAx ).
83 
                                               
82 I have collected half-monthly exchange rates in Cadiz on Amsterdam from correspondence in the Roux 
archive. When quotations are given as a range, I convert such ranges to the midpoint. The exchange rate in Cadiz 
on Amsterdam is quoted in groot/ducat of exchange. One ducat of exchange was equal to 375 maravedis, and 
one peso de plata antigua was equal to 272 maravedis. Giraudeau, 1796, p. 239. The maturity for bills in Cadiz 
on Amsterdam is 2 months (1 Usances; 1 Usance = 2 months) plus 6 days of grace at payment in Amsterdam 
(Hayes 1724, pp. 261-265). The Amsterdam interest rate is the implicit market interest rate in Flandreau, 
Galimard, Jobst and Nogues-Marco (2009b). Actually, it is the interest rate in Amsterdam from London, and I 
take it as a proxy of the interest rate in Amsterdam from Cadiz. See Flandreau and Nogues-Marco (2011) and 
Nogues-Marco (2011b) for a more detailed explanation of the methodology. 
83 The exchange rate in London on Amsterdam was expressed in schelling and groot bank per pound Sterling at 
2 usances (occasionally 2 and one half usances) and sight by Hayes (1739, p. 278). Two usances correspond to 2 
months’ maturity plus 6 days of grace (one usance in London on Amsterdam is 1 month). Sight is 3 days. 
Flandreau et. al (2009b), p. 186. England used the Julian calendar, but because Amsterdam used the Gregorian 
 39
Costs of arbitrage ( CLc ) 
Costs are taken from Roux’s invoices (see an example in Figure A4).84 The total cost is 
1.425%, which breaks down into financial costs and freight and insurance: 
- Financial costs: Comprised of brokerage (2‰) plus the intermediation cost, which was a 
brokerage fee (2‰) when the intermediary was a partner or a commission (1%) when the 
intermediary was a commission agent. For calculations, I consider the intermediary as a 
partner, which was the usual case according to the invoices. 
- Freight and Insurance:85 When organizing a maritime voyage, French ship owners 
involved as many as sixty participants in the venture, including merchant houses and bankers, 
professionals, nobles and stockholders.86 The freight was defined as a global price for the trip 
and calculated according to the volume (and/or weight) of merchandise. Freight rates 
fluctuated during the 18th century, increasing in times of war and decreasing in times of peace. 
The insurance rate depended on the distance and fluctuated according to peace or war, 
although it decreased in the long run.87 However, French freight and insurance for precious 
metals had a different logic and was constant in the 18th century. The gold and silver from 
Spain paid a fixed rate of 1% for freight and insurance, and in times of war, it was transported 
for free in the Royal vessels.88 Freight and insurance for specie was denominated “port on 
board” (“port à bord”), and it was collected directly by the vessels’ captains from the sacks 
that transported the specie: “The pieces of eight, when they arrive to Marseille, Genoa, 
London, Amsterdam, etc. pay some percentage, that is, an effective piece of eight out of every 
100 effectives pieces of eight, which the captains of the vessels get themselves from the 
sacks”.89 Additionally, according to invoices, I should add the cost of transporting the sacks to 
the port (1/4‰). 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
calendar, I converted the dates of the Julian calendar (Old Style) into the Gregorian calendar (New Style) to 
maintain the homogeneity of data. I collected half-monthly data –the precise dates correspond to the dates of the 
Cadiz quotations. When quotations are given as a range, I convert such ranges to the midpoint. 
84 Fond Roux L.IX. Section VI : affaires maritimes et commerciales. D. Marchandises. c) Produits manufacturés. 
Liasses 1,261-1,264 : Monnaies d’or et d’argent : factures. The invoices, named cost and fee account (« compte 
du cout et frais »), included the following information: shipment identification (ship and captain’s name, cargo’s 
correspondent sign and the sack’s number) and cargo description (type of pieces of eight, quantity and weight 
per sack, unitary market price, total price, expenses and final price). 
85 Rambert (1954), pp. 556-596. 
86 Taylor (1964), pp. 483-484. 
87 The result of the decline in piracy was a lowering of insurance costs during the 18th century. North (1968), p. 
960 
88 Rambert (1954), pp. 571, 582. 
89 Giraudeau, [1756] (1796), p. 460 
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Figure A4: Cost and fee account- partner (“compte du cout et frais”) 
 
 
Source: Fond Roux, L. IX liasse 1,261 : Monnaies d’or et d’argent : factures 
 
